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INDEMNIFICATION AGREEMENTS & RIGHT TO COUNSEL FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND CORPORATIONS:
Implications and Pitfalls for Prosecutors and Defense Counsel in Complex
White-Collar Enforcement and Asset Forfeiture Actions
by Joseph Hernandez
IForfeiture laws have enormous impli-
cai n Ifor small and medium sized corpora-
I i.-,3 w uwsed of criminal activity. For instance,
a white-collar money laundering or fraud en-
forcement action may be very broad due to the
interconnections between criminal activity and
financial transactions. Defendants often use
financial institutions and other property to fa-
cilitate their activities. In these cases, it is nor-
mal to include a criminal and/or civil forfeiture
count against property representing the pro-
ceeds or means that advanced the fraudulent
conduct. Those assets that are "Involved in" or
"facilitate" the fraudulent conduct are forfeit-
able' and may be seized in an ex parte hear-
ing pending the outcome of a criminal or civil
enforcement action. Consequently, bank ac-
counts, cars, planes, real property, among other
things, may be subject to forfeiture that assists
with developing, advancing, concealing, or oth-
erwise enabling criminal activity.
Assume the following set of facts. A
medium-sized corporation (twenty to fifty em-
ployees) operates a business that generates sev-
eral million dollars of revenue each year. For
several years, though, a few executives and em-
ployees allegedly conducted criminal activity
that benefitted the corporation and individu-
als. Both are indicted with a criminal forfei-
ture count against the individuals, plus a paral-
lel civil forfeiture complaint is filed against the
corporation. The government has seized nearly
1 18 U.S.C. §§ 981(a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006); see also 18
U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006).
all of the corporation's assets and the corpora-
tion is barely able to continue operating. Simi-
larly, the individuals have had nearly all their
personal assets seized pending the outcome of
their prosecutions. It is the corporation's pol-
icy to indemnify its executives and employees
pursuant to state corporate law; however, the
corporation is unable to indemnify because the
underlying asset seizure prevents it.
Is a pretrial hearing available regarding
the seized corporate assets? What are the stan-
dards to securing the release of corporate as-
sets? Who has standing to pursue that claim?
What occurs when both parties claim they need
those assets, which have been subject to an ex
parte seizure to secure defense counsel? These
are the challenges white-collar criminal practi-
tioners must be prepared to manage when the
ocurrence of a corporate asset seizure affects
an indemnification agreement.
I. Forfeiture and Kaley v. United States
A. Civil and Criminal Forfeiture
The United States federal government
and most states have adopted broad civil and
criminal forfeiture statutes. 2 These laws sub-
ject all forms of property that either facilitate
2 This article will not provide an in-depth analysis and
review of forfeiture. It will be limited to analyzing the general
procedural and substantive issues that prosecutors and defense
counsel will likely confront when managing a complex white-
collar action involving the pretrial seizure of assets that are
claimed to be necessary to pay for corporate and individual
legal defense costs.
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or are the proceeds of criminal activity to for-
feiture. Forfeiture is designed, inter alia, to
deter criminal activity by serving as a form of
punishment and to combat the incentives that
may make criminal activity valuable by disgorg-
ing illicit gains.4
Civil forfeiture is an in rem action against
property used to facilitate or represent the pro-
ceeds of criminal activity.' There are several
federal civil forfeiture laws; however, two com-
monly used statutes include 18 U.S.C. § 981 (fi-
nancial crimes) and 21 U.S.C. § 881 (narcotics).
For purposes of white-collar crime, 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(A) renders forfeitable all real and
personal property relating to money launder-
ing, currency transaction reporting crimes, fi-
nancial transaction crimes, or fraud against the
United States. These statutes provide that the
government may, in certain circumstances, seize
and take control of property prior to securing
forfeiture upon the demonstration of probable
cause.' Pursuant to the Relation Back Doc-
trine, the government is vested with title to the
property upon the commission of the act giving
rise to forfeiture.' The government's burden to
secure forfeiture is by a preponderance of the
evidence.'
Criminal forfeiture, on the other hand,
is an in personam proceeding designed to serve
as a form of punishment in the penalty phase.9
Typically, it is attached to an indictment as a
separate count. There are a range of statutes
that involve criminal forfeiture but three preva-
lent statutes are: 18 U.S.C. § 982 (money laun-
dering and financial crimes); 18 U.S.C. § 1963
(RICO); and 21 U.S.C. § 853 (narcotics). Ad-
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (mandating that a person
convicted of certain offenses be ordered to forfeit property
involved in the offense).
4 S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 84 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3267.
5 See, e.g., United States v. One 1998 Tractor, 288 F.
Supp. 2d 710 (W.D. Va. 2003).
6 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(1)-(4) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 881(b)
(2006).
7 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (2006).
8 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(1) (2006).
9 United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1082 (3d Cir.
1996).
ditionally, each statute permits "substitute as-
sets" to be used in the event the assets subject
to forfeiture are not located or available.10
The structure of both civil and criminal
forfeiture permits the government to pursue
parallel enforcement actions. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(c), when a civil forfeiture action is au-
thorized, a successful criminal conviction can
serve as the predicate for action on the civil
forfeiture if no specific statutory provision is
available for criminal forfeiture. This enables
the government to combine a criminal convic-
tion and civil forfeiture in a consolidated pro-
ceeding." Additionally, the government may
stay a civil forfeiture proceeding pending the
outcome of the criminal case. 12
To assure assets are not used, concealed,
lost, or destroyed prior to the completion of a
civil or criminal action, the government seizes
the property. Typically, this is achieved through
an exparte proceeding via a grand jury indict-
ment in the case of a criminal forfeiture or a
warrant based on probable cause in the context
of a civil forfeiture."
10 18 U.S.C. § 1963(m) (2006); 21 U.S.C. §§ 853(p)
(1)-(2) (2006).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 619 F.3d 713, 720 (7th
Cir. 2010) (asserting that criminal forfeiture is available for
convictions of mail and wire fraud, not just circumstances af-
fecting financial institutions); United States v. Schlesinger, 514
F.3d 277, 277-78 (2d Cir. 2008);
12 18 U.S.C. § 981(g)(1) (2006).
13 Under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act
(CAFRA), the government must show a "substantial con-
nection" between the assets and criminal activity. See Pub.
L. No. 106-185 (2000) codified as 18 U.S.C. § 983(c)(3)
(2006). Previously, courts had applied two general approaches
in assessing probable cause: "substantial connection" and
"facilitation." Under the "substantial connection" standard
the government must show that that the property was ac-
tively involved in perpetuating criminal activity. See United
States v. $252,000 U.S. Currency, 484 F.3d 1271, 1274-75
(10th Cir. 2007) (affirming that in a civil forfeiture action the
government demonstrated probable cause that currency was
"substantially connected" to illegal drug trafficking when it
was lawfully discovered in a box and briefcase, bundled in
stacks and wrapped in cellophane smelling of marijuana, and
the driver initially denied knowledge and then later claimed it
was for a business venture). Contra United States v. One 1989
Jaguar XJ6, No. 92 C 1491,WL 157630 (N.D. Ill. May 13,
1993), at *2-3 (holding that a "substantial connection" was not
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B. Constitutional Implications
The seizure of property implicates the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights of indi-
viduals and corporations." When a defendant
claims he or she needs those assets to secure
counsel of choice, courts have recognized that
individuals have an opportunity to a post-m-
dictment hearing.15 However, the scope of that
hearing has led to a split across the federal cir-
cuits. On October 16, 2013, the United States.
Supreme Court heard arguments in Kaley .
United States." The question presented was
whether the Fifth and Sixth Amendments re-
quire that a defendant have the opportunity
to challenge the underlying charges of an in-
dictment or merely the traceability of assets to
criminal activity. The majority view, colloquial-
ly known as a Jones-Farmer hearing, provides a
defendant who has been indicted with a pretri-
al hearing to demonstrate that property is not
shown when a vehicle that provided transportation between
the locations where alleged fraudulent transactions occurred to
sustain a seizure of the vehicle). Alternatively, if the statu-
tory language includes the language "to facilitate," it grants a
more permissive degree of forfeiture to forfeit legitimate funds
or property that have been commingled with illicit funds or
property. See U.S. v. Coffman, 859 F.Supp.2d 871, 875-76
(E.D. Ky. 2012) (holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 982 "clean"
funds commingled with tainted funds are forfeitable because
the commingling enables and disguises money laundering).
Contra United States v. $448,342.85 U.S. Currency, 969 F.2d
474, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that pooling tainted funds
with legitimate funds was not sufficient to forfeit property).
14 See Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S.
617, 624-27 (1989) (holding that a defendant does not have a
Sixth Amendment right to use assets subject to a pretrial re-
straining order to retain counsel of choice); see also Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (holding that in
weighing due process considerations a court should assess
three factors: one, the private interest that will be affected;
two, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used and value represented by additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and three, the government's
interest at stake, including the burdens of additional or substi-
tute procedures).
15 United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 645-49 (10th
Cir.1998); United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1191-94
(2d Cir.1991); United States v. Long, 654 F.2d 911, 915 (3d
Cir.1981); United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1324-25
(8th Cir. 1985); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706,
724-26 (7th Cir. 1988).
16 Kaley v. United States, Docket No. 12-464 (U.S. Oct
16, 2013).
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traceable to criminal activity." The minority
view holds that the due process issues impli-
cated require a more comprehensive hearing
that permits a defendant to present evidence
attacking the basis for the underlying criminal
indictment."
In Kaley, the facts involve a white-collar en-
forcement action where personal assets have
been subject to pretrial seizure. The alleged
facts, highly summarized, are that Kerri and
Brian Kaley were involved in a scheme steal-
ing and reselling medical devices. 9 A criminal
forfeiture count led to the seizure of property
that a grand jury determined was the proceeds
of criminal activity. The Kaleys claimed they
needed those assets to retain their defense
counsel. 20 At the Jones-Farmer hearing, the trial
court limited the scope of review to traceability
without permitting inquiries into the review of
the grand jury's indictment. When the Kaleys
failed to present evidence and requested an op-
portunity to challenge the basis for the indict-
ment, the district court affirmed its protective
order to seized assets.21
Based on questioning at the Supreme
Court, the Justices appeared flummoxed as
how to resolve the due process and Fifth and
Sixth Amendment issues presented.22 While
17 United States v. Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 646-47 (10th
Cir. 1998) (holding that a proper balance of private and
government interests requires a post-restraint, pre-trial hear-
ing only upon defendant's motion); United States v. Fanner,
274 F.3d 800, 805 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that due process
requires a hearing to challenge probable cause on the limited
grounds of traceability).
18 See United States v. Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1186, 1195,
1197 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that additional safeguards are
necessary to protect a defendant's due process rights); United
States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (hold-
ing that pre-deprivation hearings are required unless there are
extraordinary circumstances).
19 United States v. Kaley, 79 F.3d 1246, 1249 (11th Cir.
2009).
20 Id. at 1250-51.
21 United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 1580 (2013).
22 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Kaley v.
United States (2013) (No. 12-464), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oml arguments/argument tran-
scripts/12-464j 3ko.pdf [hereinafter Kaley Oral Argument].
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the Justices seemed to agree that a defendant
has a right to be heard in a meaningful manner
at an appropriate time, the extent of that op-
portunity to be heard was largely unclear from
the dialogue at oral arguments.23
The longstanding tradition and consti-
tutional mandate is that a grand jury's determi-
nation is presumptively valid for a criminal in-
dictment.24 To this issue, Justice Alito expressed
concern that a pretrial hearing could aggravate
the government's case by requiring the revela-
tion of sensitive information and witness iden-
tification. 25 This was a key point emphasized
in the government's petition for certiorari and
brief 26 Justice Ginsburg similarly expressed
reservation as to whether a judge could preside
over a case when a judge determines probable
cause does not exist.27 Alternatively, Justices
Roberts and Scalia seemed skeptical of the
government's position, with Justice Scalia ask-
ing whether courts should demand more than
probable cause when seized assets are neces-
sary for securing counsel of choice.2 8 Justice
Breyer seemed to present a possible compro-
mise between the positions when he suggested
that defendants could have greater opportuni-
ties to explore the nexus between assets and
an indictment subject to greater control by the
judge.2 9 With such control, the judge can im-
pose restriction that avoids a "mini-trial" that
the federal government argued would arise.
C. Jones-Farmer Hearing Requirements
The law currently requires a defendant
show three factors to succeed in a Jones-Farmer
hearing.30 First, the defendant must demon-
23 See generally id.
24 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956)
(stating "[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and
unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the pros-
ecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for a trial of the
charge on the merits").
25 Kaley Oral Argument at 12-13, 46-47.
26 Brief for the United States at 11, Kaley v. United
States, 677 F.3d 1316 (2013) (No. 12-464).
27 Kaley Oral Argument at 9-10.
28 See id. at 30-32
29 See id. at 32-34, 48-49.
30 Jones, 160 F.3d at 647-68 (10th Cir.); Farmer, 274
strate he has standing to challenge the seizure.
Second, he must allege and then show he has
no other assets available to pay for his crimi-
nal defense.32 Any valuable property that a de-
fendant owns must be expensed or committed
towards legal defense fees. An exception may
be available upon a showing that procedural
due process rights are at stake," or evidence
that seized property is owned by a third-par-
ty.34 Third, the defendant bears the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the underlying property did not facilitate
or is not the proceeds of criminal activity.35
It. Indemnification Agreements:
Implications for the Seizure of Corporate
Assets
A question implicated, but not specifi-
cally addressed by Kaley, is the impact asset
seizure may have on the ability to honor an in-
demnification agreement when both corporate
and individual asset seizures disable securing
counsel of choice. An indemnification agree-
ment is provided pursuant to state corporation
law by protecting corporate agents execu-
tives, officers, and employees from liability
associated with decisions committed within
the scope of their employment." The limita-
tion on these agreements is that an agent must
act in "good faith" and not be convicted of a
criminal violation.3 7
F.3d at 803-04; Monsanto, 924 F.2d at 1195-96 (2d Cir. 1991).
31 Id.
32 Jones, 160 F.3d 641, 647-68 (10th Cir.); Farmer, 274
F.3d at 803-04; Monsanto, 924 F.2d 1195-96 (2d Cir. 1991).
33 See, e.g., United States v. James Daniel Good Real
Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 52-53 (1993) (holding that government
violated procedural due process rights by seizing real property
exparte without notice or hearing for the owner, reasoning
that property cannot be moved or hidden, thus concerns about
defendant moving, losing, or hiding property are not present);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 985 (codifying the position articulated in
James Daniel Good Real Prop).
34 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(1) (innocent-owner defense); 18
U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(A)(i) (bona-fide purchaser for value).
35 18 U.S.C. § 983(d)(3)(B)(iii).
36 See generally MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156D, §
8.51 (West); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (West); N.Y Bus.
CORP. LAW § 725 (McKinney).
37 See Waltuch v. Conticommodity Sers., Inc., 88
F.3d 87, 92-93 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying indemnification to a
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Criminal or civil forfeiture action represents
a threat to the ability of a corporation to up-
hold an indemnification agreement. A seizure
of nearly all of a corporation's assets raises the
question of whether a corporation could make
a claim to assets on behalf of itself and an in-
dividual claiming indemnification; or whether
a corporation may only assert a claim for itself.
Unique risks are presented that prosecutors
and defense counsel will likely need to consid-
er when an individual claims that a corporation
owes them a duty to indemnify but is denied
indemnification because of the seizure of cor-
porate assets. Depending upon the extent of
the government's pretrial seizure, the coopera-
tion of the individual defendant and corpora-
tion, and the complexity of a given case, stra-
tegic decisions made by defense counsel and
prosecutors must weigh a range of potential
factors.
The standards for a Jones-Farmer hear-
ing would apply to a corporation asserting a
claim to seized corporate assets: standing, no
other available assets, and preponderance of
the evidence that assets are not traceable to
criminal activity. With respect to standing, the
operative question is, "to whom are corporate
assets vested?" This is almost always the corpo-
ration itself, which means only the corporation
has standing to challenge the seizure of corpo-
rate assets and not the individual defendants
or shareholders." Thus, the question becomes
what additional recourse an individual may
have to secure the release of assets pursuant to
an indemnification agreement.
vice-president for failure to demonstrate "good faith" under
Delaware corporate law).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Wyly, 193 F.3d 289, 304
(5th Cir. 1999) (denying standing to shareholders who chal-
lenged seizure of corporate assets because under Louisiana
law shareholder's interest is in stock issued and not corporate
assets); United States v. $20,193.39 U.S. Currency, 16 F.3d
344, 346 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that unsecured creditors,
unlike secured creditors, lacked standing to challenge civil
forfeiture of property seized from businesses, even when all
assets were seized); United States v. New Silver Palace Rest.,
810 F.Supp. 440, 442 (E.D.N.Y 1992) (holding shareholders
of restaurant used to facilitate drug transactions did not have
standing, since shareholders were not owners or lienholders
with respect to corporate assets).
Criminal Law Practitioner
A. Defense Counsel: Strategy and
Considerations
When the interests of the individual
and corporation align, the optimal strategy for
defense counsel and the corporation is coop-
eration. The individual wants to avoid being
convicted of the underlying crime; similarly,
the corporation does not want to be liable un-
der respondeat superior. The corporation could
assert a Jones-Farmer claim for itself and the
defendant by claiming the government seizure
of corporate assets causes a breach of contract.
Because the corporation is the party in breach
in this instance, it could attach as part of a
Jones-Farmer motion, an invoice detailing what
is necessary to pay the legal fees of both parties.
This enables the individual defendant to avoid
being subject to a Jones-Farmer hearing and the
concomitant requirement that he have no per-
sonal assets available to pay legal defense fees. 9
On the contrary, when the interests of
the individual and corporation diverge, the
corporation may assert that the individual de-
fendant has failed to uphold his duty of "good
faith" and will only pursue a Jones-Farmer mo-
tion to advance the interest of the corporation.
The corporation is asserting as an affirmative
defense that public policy permits it to deny in-
demnification. This claim would raise contract
and corporate law disputes that could involve
complex statutory and legal questions regard-
ing the terms of the agreement. The individual
defendant's recourse in this situation is likely
twofold: one, sue for enforcement of the in-
demnification agreement, or two, move for a
Jones-Farmer hearing releasing personal assets
that have been seized and then seek indemni-
fication in the event of success on the merits.40
Clearly, the best strategy in this situation de-
39 To the author's knowledge, there has been no case
where this has occurred in the context of a Jones-Farmer
forfeiture proceeding.
40 Delaware law provides that when an agent has been
"successful" on the merits, that person shall be indemnified
for expenses including attorneys' fees. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(c); see also MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 156D, § 8.52
(mandating indemnification when a defendant is "[w]holly
successful, on the merits or otherwise").
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pends upon individual circumstances.
B. Prosecution: Strategy and Considerations
The prosecutor's goal is to assure that
forfeitable assets are maintained pending the
outcome of a criminal prosecution or civil ac-
tion. While needing to be mindful of their ac-
tions on interfering with a defendant's access
to counsel, a prosecutor could argue that an
indemnification agreement is itself forfeitable.
A prosecutor could reasonably argue that an
indemnification agreement represents a means
to facilitate criminal activity. In a sophisti-
cated corporate fraud scheme, the individuals
involved may consider the legal risks of their
actions and be prepared for the possibility of
subsequent liability. Thus, indemnification is
not available but instead should be considered,
along with other means that facilitate criminal
activity, to be forfeitable.
For instance, in UnitedStates 9. Wittig, the
prosecution brought a forty count indictment
with a forfeiture count for numerous pieces of
property, including the right to advanced pay-
ment of legal fees, as mandated in the compa-
ny's Articles of Incorporation.4 1 The prosecu-
tion claimed that Wittig and a co-conspirator
joined the company, Westar Energy, with the
intent to defraud the company of millions of
dollars.42 Prior to trial, the government argued
that the right to advancement was only avail-
able if the defendant "came on board with the
proper intent," but they failed to present ex-
trinsic evidence, relying only on argument at
a Jones-Farmer hearing.43 The court denied the
motion, ruling argument alone was insufficient
to support a probable cause determination that
the indemnification agreement was connected
to the alleged criminal activity.44 Following a
mistrial and the full presentation of the gov-
ernment's case-in-chief, the prosecution moved
again to restrain the advancement of legal
41 See United States v. Wittig, 333 F.Supp.2d 1048,
1053-54 (D. Kan. 2004).
42 See id. at 1051-52.
43 Id. at 1052.
44 Id.
fees. 4 At this time, the court granted the gov-
ernment's motion, reasoning the evidence pre-
sented at trial supported this argument.46 Thus,
an indemnification agreement can be subject
to pretrial seizure when the right facts present
themselves. As demonstrated by Wittig, a pros-
ecutor has to calculate the risks of exposing in-
formation relating to his case-in-chief, a point
emphasized during oral arguments in Kaley.
A prosecutor should also be cautious
when seeking to block advancement of legal
fees. There is a fine line between an argument
that indemnification is forfeitable and inter-
ference with a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. Specifically, a prosecutor
should limit his arguments to those subjects
relating to the enforcement of forfeiture laws
in a specific case rather than advancing other
policy or legal goals. For instance, in United
States (. Stein,4 the U.S. Department of Justice
adopted a policy that an employer's payment of
an employee's attorney fees would count as a
lack of cooperation. The government's policy,
and statements to the company during litiga-
tion, led the corporation to cease paying legal
fees. The court dismissed the case citing viola-
tions of the employees' due process rights.
III. Conclusion
The decision in Kaley will help resolve
the procedural parameters that a criminal de-
fendant has in seeking to unfreeze assets sub-
ject to a pretrial seizure order to pay for legal
defense costs. It is inevitable that there will be
unanswered questions regarding issues of in-
demnification rights when a corporation and
individual defendant argue they need corpo-
rate assets to secure defense counsel pursuant
to an indemnification agreement. However, it
is not unreasonable to foresee such a case giv-
en the sweeping nature of forfeiture statutes.
45 See United States v. Wittig, No. 03-40142JAR, 2005
WL 1227914, at *1 (D. Kan. May 23, 2005).
46 Id. at *4.
47 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd 541 F.3d
130 (2d Cir. 2008).
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